Assessing The Impact Of Medical Malpractice Awards, Tort Reform, And Investment Returns Upon Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums by Smith, William J. et al.
Journal of Business & Economics Research – Fourth Quarter 2015 Volume 13, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 175 The Clute Institute 
Assessing The Impact Of Medical 
Malpractice Awards, Tort Reform, And 
Investment Returns Upon Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Premiums 
William J. Smith, University of West Georgia, USA 
Tania A. Celis, University of West Georgia, USA 
Bruce M. Bird, University of West Georgia, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
For most doctors, obtaining medical malpractice insurance coverage each year represents a 
significant expense.  During the past three decades, researchers have developed several 
competing theories to explain changes in the cost of obtaining medical malpractice insurance in 
the United States.  This article focuses on the relationship, on a nationwide basis, between 
medical malpractice awards, the presence of tort reform, investment returns by insurers, and the 
impact of each upon the cost of obtaining medical malpractice insurance.  The results of a 
multivariate equation are then used to analyze the relative impacts of these competing theories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he past three decades have witnessed dramatic changes in medical malpractice insurance premiums.1 
A spirited debate has ensued regarding which factors are most significant in explaining the changes in 
such premiums over time. One theory is that a decrease in an insurer’s return on its investment 
portfolio has the effect of increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums. A second is that malpractice 
premiums are the direct result of medical malpractice awards and settlements.  Stated alternatively, states having 
higher than average medical malpractice awards also tend to have higher than average malpractice insurance 
premiums2.  A third theory is that an increase in passage of state-level tort reform changes the likelihood of massive 
settlements or judgments in malpractice cases, and thus, such legislation has the effect of decreasing such premiums 
by reducing insured risk.   
 
In many parts of the U.S., during certain time periods, medical costs have risen faster than the overall rate 
of inflation.  Rising medical malpractice insurance premiums represent a cost that some doctors may decide to pass 
along to their patients in the form of higher prices for medical services rendered. It is also possible that the perceived 
threat of medical malpractice litigation may result in some doctors providing additional precautionary medical 
services to their patients.3   
                                                
1 Neale, F. Eastman, K. Drake, P. (2009). Dynamics of the Insurance Market for Medical Malpractice Insurance. Medical malpractice insurance 
provides coverage for members of the medical profession for liability resulting from claims of professional negligence. The Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 2009, Vol.76, No.1, pg 221-47, pg. 221. Changes in medical malpractice insurance premiums are typically computed on an inflation-
adjusted, per-doctor basis. See Appendix 1.    
2 Moreover, time periods in which higher than average medical malpractice awards occur are the same time periods in which higher than average 
medical malpractice insurance premiums occur. 
3 A study by Dubay, Kaestner and Waidmann (1999) provides evidence that physicians are more likely to order unnecessary cesarean procedures 
in obstetrics to avoid litigation, but that the impact of increased cesarean sections to mitigate malpractice lawsuits on total obstetric care costs is 
T 
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This research focuses upon the relationship, on a nationwide basis, between medical malpractice awards, 
insurers’ return on investments, the presence of tort reform, and the cost of medical malpractice insurance 
premiums.  Because many insurers operate in more than a single state, it would be difficult to conclude that all of the 
costs associated with massive jury awards, settlements, or gains/losses accruing from insurance companies’ 
investments would be confined to a single state, regardless of the current legislative climate involving malpractice4.  
Based on this, we estimate the cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums for the nation overall using the 
following independent variables:  malpractice awards, insurers’ return on investments, and the existence of tort 
reform.  We focus primarily upon the results of a multivariate regression to analyze the above-mentioned theories 
that compete to explain changes in the cost of medical malpractice insurance in the U.S. 
 
Literature Review 
 
A number of researchers have analyzed the rise in medical malpractice insurance premiums (Gius, 1998; 
Helland & Showalter, 2009; Hillman & Cluff, 2003; Kessler, 2006; Kilgore, Morrisey, & Nelson, 2006; Lai & Witt, 
1992; Neale, Eastman, & Peterson Drake, 2009; Viscusi & et al., 1993). Most of the research during the 1990s and 
2000s use aggregate premium revenues as a proxy for malpractice premium levels. Depending on the years under 
observation, researchers have found varying levels of impact associated with state-level malpractice liability 
limitations. Lai and Witt (1992) examined the effect of insurer expectations upon the supply and cost of premiums.  
Lai and Witt sought to explain the growth rate of premiums in terms of 1) the change in the growth rate of losses and 
expenses; and 2) the variance in the growth rate of expenses. Their research concluded that increases in the mean 
and dispersion of losses and expenses did explain the increase in premiums.  
 
Gius (1998), using a long time-series data set, found that malpractice liability limitations had virtually no 
effect on insurers’ aggregate premium revenues. In a study using a shorter time-series data set, Viscusi et al. (1993) 
found that some limitations on medical malpractice liability resulted in substantial and statistically significant 
reductions in aggregate premiums. Nelson, Morrisey, and Kilgore (2006) suggest that, regarding the findings of 
recent research, the question is about the magnitude of the impact that liability limitations have on aggregate 
premium revenues, rather than whether or not such an impact exists. The research of Neale et al. suggests that 
shorter, more rigorous, empirical studies tend to point to liability limitations resulting in significant aggregate 
premium reductions with relatively large magnitudes, while works that use longer time series tend to result in 
smaller estimated impacts on premium revenue (or revenue growth) over time. 
 
In “Dynamics of the Market for Medical Malpractice Insurance”, Neale et al. (1992) built upon Lai and 
Witt’s prior research.  Neale et al. examined the stability of the market for medical malpractice insurance by 
analyzing financial data from 1993-2003 collected by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC). The variables analyzed by Neale et al. included the number of insurers writing medical malpractice 
insurance, the relationship between growth rates of premiums and losses, variance losses, and investment income. 
The research of Neale et al. differs methodologically from that of Lai and Witt. Neale et al. consider “losses 
incurred” rather than “losses paid”.5   The variable “losses incurred” takes into account the fact that insurers price 
their policies based upon expected future losses. Accordingly, “losses incurred” is thought to allow for flexibility in 
testing changing expectations.  
 
Neale et al. sought to confirm the presence of market instability in the data they analyzed. To do this, they 
chose to use the bivariate Granger causality model. It allows for the estimation and comparison of the explanatory 
strength of two variables for purposes of determining whether past losses predict premiums, or, in the alternative, 
whether past premiums predict losses.  Neale et al. noted that the first relationship contained more explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                       
relatively small and varies with the socioeconomic status of the mother. 
4 Scant information exists regarding the potential for malpractice insurance providers spreading their costs (or losses) directly (or indirectly) 
across state lines.  The implicit assumption of most arguments made in favor of comprehensive malpractice and tort reform is that malpractice 
awards are confined to a single state, and as such, the impact of massive jury awards or settlements will only be important for insurance costs, and 
subsequently medical costs, within that particular state where the award or settlement occurred.  If, however, malpractice insurance companies 
operate in multiple states, there is the possibility that tort reform legislation in one state will have spillover impacts on insurance costs in other 
states without caps on malpractice payouts, and payouts in states without caps may have the effect of increasing premiums in states with caps. 
5 By way of analogy, “losses incurred” is more akin to an accrual-based accounting concept, whereas “losses paid” is more akin to a cash-basis 
accounting concept. 
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power than the second.  Thus, a causal relationship exists between direct losses and net premiums written.6 The 
authors found that, of the years examined, 2001 turned out to be the most unstable. Stated alternatively, the most 
significant misalignment between direct losses incurred and net premiums written occurred in 2001.    
 
After establishing the presence of market instability, Neale et al. set out to examine the effect of selected 
variables (growth rates of net premiums written, direct losses incurred, direct defense and cost containment fees, and 
total losses incurred) upon the market over time.  The authors recognized that the data might be distorted by the fact 
that insurers may 1) enter a market when few net premiums are written and there are little or no direct losses; and/or 
2) leave a market when few net premiums are written but there are large direct losses. To account for such 
distortion, both mean and median growth rates were considered.  Neale et al. observed that the median growth rate 
of direct losses incurred increased in all years except 1995, 1998, and 2000.  The authors deduced that “losses, 
premiums, defense costs, and claim containment fees do not necessarily grow in a similar manner”7.  
 
In testing for the effects of changes in the variables over time, Neale et al. expected that a strong, positive 
relationship between premiums and losses would continue to exist over time. Premiums and losses were expected to 
increase at the same natural rate so long as the rate of investment income growth remained constant.  To test this, 
Neale et al. used geometric growth rates to reduce the risk of bias.8  
 
The performance of insurers over time revealed that the growth of policyholder surplus has declined since 
1994 while the growth in net investment income has steadily deteriorated from 1993 to 2000.  The authors 
concluded that insurers’ actions to increase premiums are justified because the growth rate of losses has exceeded 
the growth rates of premiums.  Thus, the instability in medical malpractice insurance appears to be driven by the 
direct losses incurred by the insurance companies. Furthermore, the data suggest that changes in the underwriting 
and legal systems do contribute to the growth of losses and related growth of medical malpractice insurance 
premiums.  
 
A General Accounting Office (GAO) study analyzed data relating to seven states: California, Florida, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas9. The GAO study sought to 1) describe the extent of 
increases in medical malpractice insurance rates; 2) analyze the factors that contributed to those increases; and 3) 
identify changes in the medical malpractice insurance market that might make premium rates different from that of 
past periods (most notably the periods from 1970-75 and 1975-1989).  
 
The GAO concluded that insurers’ losses, declines in investment income, a less competitive climate, and 
climbing reinsurance10 rates have all contributed to changes in premium rates. Analysis by the GAO identified 
increased losses on claims as the primary contributor to higher medical malpractice premium rates. The 15 largest 
medical malpractice insurers in 2001 (with a combined market share of 64.3%) incurred losses (including both 
payments to plaintiffs to resolve claims and the costs associated with defending those claims) of approximately 78% 
of the insurer’s total expenses. Because insurers base their premium rates on their expected costs, the GAO indicated 
that anticipated losses were the primary determinant of premium rates. 
 
In all seven states sampled, aggregate incurred losses increased substantially after 1998. Mississippi and 
Pennsylvania experienced the highest increases (197.5% and 97.2%, respectively). The GAO anticipated that paid 
losses -- and, thus, premium rates -- would continue to rise from 2003-2006 in accordance with insurers’ higher 
expectations of losses. 
 
The GAO also explored the effect of tort legislation enacted into law in the mid-1970s that occurred in 
some of the states that it sampled.  Such legislation is designed to reduce insurers’ losses by limiting the number of 
claims filed, the size of awards and settlements, and the time and costs associated with resolving claims. For the 
states which did not enact tort reform, the GAO anecdotally observed the effects of imposed caps on non-monetary 
                                                
6  Neale et al. (1992).  p 231. It should be noted that the causality was not consistent each year. 
7  Id .at p 233. 
8 By way of contrast, Lai and Witt used arithmetic growth rates.  
9  Hillman, R., & Cluff, L. (2003). Medical malpractice insurance: multiple factors have contributed to increased premium rates (GAO-03-702). 
United States General Accounting Office. Washington, D.C.  
10 Reinsurance is also known as excess loss coverage.    
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losses such as pain and suffering.  Both tort reform and caps on non-monetary losses led to a reduction in the 
severity and frequency of claims filed in those states. As such, the expectations of insurers’ losses may have been 
affected by past -- or the potential for future -- tort legislation, resulting in lower real insurance costs per doctor in 
the mid-2000s. 
 
In “The Determinants of the Cost of Medical Liability Insurance”, Kessler (2006) analyzed data from the 
Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  Kessler 
observed that approximately 87% of malpractice insurers' expenses consisted of direct losses plus loss adjustment 
expenses incurred.  Further, Kessler noted that, according to the NAIC, total incurred losses in medical malpractice 
increased in real terms by 178.2% from 1991 to 2003 (94.5% per capita).  Kessler observed: “If other insurers’ 
expenses remained roughly constant, a very simple, competitive model of the industry would predict that premium 
rates should have increased by approximately 82%,11 strikingly similar to the increase of 71% in the professional 
liability insurance component of the CMS Medicare Economic Index Market Basket” (Kessler 2006, 15). 
 
Other variables explored by the GAO and Neale et al were considered by Kessler as only marginally 
explanatory regarding the increase of premium rates. Kessler noted that “low entry barriers, declines in insurer 
investment income or increases in health care costs can account for at most a small fraction of the increase in 
premiums” (Kessler 2006, 23).   Kessler concluded that increases in tort awards, settlement payments, and defense 
costs explain why premiums have risen.  Accordingly, reforms to the tort laws of various states --such as reasonable 
caps on non-economic damages-- substantially reduce the cost of insurance claims and, in turn, premiums. 
 
Helland and Showalter (2009) examined the impact of malpractice reforms in the years 1983 and 1988 
using Florida malpractice awards data.  They used measure of liability risk based on incurred losses to estimate the 
impact of malpractice reform on physician labor market behavior (specifically the number of hours worked by 
doctors).  They estimated the labor elasticity of liability exposure to be -0.285 for the pooled sample of physicians 
and -1.224 for physicians age 55 or older.  This suggests that older physicians are substantially more sensitive to 
changes in liability risk than are younger physicians.  Further, Helland and Showalter estimate that an increase of $1 
in expected liability should increase medical malpractice premiums by between $.70 and $1.05. 
 
Many articles in this area paint a rather bleak picture about future trends in medical liability insurance 
claims and premiums. The article “Chronic Pain Malpractice Claims on the Rise”12 focuses on a presentation made 
by Kelly Pollak, MD, (University of Washington and Seattle Cancer Care Alliance) at the Anethesiology 2014 
conference in New Orleans, LA. Using data from the Anesthesia Closed Claims Database, Dr. Pollak and her 
colleagues examined 10,367 malpractice claims.  She noted: “Malpractice claims associated with chronic pain have 
increased in number and severity over the past three decades and they have increased out of proportion to the 
increase in pain anesthesiologists.”  
 
 A 2011 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine13 found that “over a medical lifetime, 
most physicians across all specialties can expect at least 1 claim.” The odds increase to 99% for physicians in the 5 
most claim-prone specialties: neurosurgery, thoracic cardiovascular surgery, general surgery, orthopaedic surgery, 
and plastic surgery. Across specialties, both the likelihood of medical malpractice suits and the amount of indemnity 
payments vary significantly. Although the cumulative risk of a physician facing a medical malpractice claims over 
his (or her) career is high, most medical malpractice claims do not result in a plaintiff receiving a payment. 
 
 A 2013 study published on-line in JAMA Internal Medicine14 examined two insurers’ pooled closed claims 
data from 1/1/2005- 12/31/2009.  The insurers provided malpractice coverage to most of the physicians in the State 
of Massachusetts during this 5-year period. According to the study:    
                                                
11 Computed as follows: 87% x 94.5%.   
12  Helwick, C. (2014). Chronic pain malpractice claims on the rise. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/833345_print.  
13 Jena, A., Seabury,S., Lakdawalla, D., and Chandra, A. (2011). Malpractice risk according to physician specialty. N Engl J Med 2011;365:629-
636.  See also: Lowes, R, (2011). Most physicians will face malpractice claim by age 65. Retrieved from  
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/748198_print.  
14  Schiff, G., Puopolo, A., Huben-Kearney, A., Yu, W., Keohane,,C., McDonough, P, Ellis, B., Bates, D., Biondolillo, M. (2013 ). Primary 
care closed claims experience of Massachusetts malpractice insurers. JAMA Intern Med. 2013;173(22):2063-2068.  Retrieved from 
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…there were 7224 malpractice claims of which 551 (7.7%) were from primary care practices. Allegations 
were related to diagnosis in 397 (72.1%), medications in 68 (12.3%), other medical treatment in 41 
(7.4%)… Primary care cases were significantly more likely to be settled (35.2% vs 20.5%) or result in a 
verdict for the plaintiff (1.6% vs 0.9%) compared with non–general medical malpractice claims (P  <  .001). 
 
Stated alternatively, while primary care cases accounted for less than 1 in 10 medical malpractice cases, 
these cases were far more likely to be either settled, or lost in a jury trial, when compared with non-general medical 
claims. 
 
An on-line article by Emma Wallace et al. (2013) 15 reviewed 34 published studies of malpractice claims. 
These studies took place in the United States (15), U.K. (9), Australia (7), France (2), and Canada (1).  The most 
common cause of malpractice claims across these studies involved missed or delayed diagnosis. This occurred in 26- 
63% of such claims. The next most common cause --representing 5.6-20% of such claims-- involved medication 
error.   
 
 A 2012 survey by the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) found that most 
ob/gyns took restrictive and/or defensive actions to avoid being sued. 16 Of those obstetricians surveyed, “18.1% saw 
fewer high-risk obstetric patients, 15.1% performed more cesarean deliveries, and 13.5% stopped performing 
vaginal birth after cesarean delivery.” Of those practicing gynecology, “12.4% performed fewer surgeries and 5.2% 
dropped major operations.” On a somewhat brighter note, the “percentage of obstetrician/gynecologists who said 
they had altered their practice because of the risk or fear of getting sued decreased from 62.9% in 2009 to 57.9% in 
2012.” Also, malpractice insurance premiums as a percentage of revenue –along with the number of claims 
reported-- decreased somewhat from 2009 to 2012.    
 
 A study published in the Journal of the American College of Radiology (JACR) 17 used linear regression to 
analyze National Practitioner Data Bank claims data from 1991 to 2009 to: “(1) define the magnitude of malpractice 
costs related to communication failures in test result notification and (2) determine if these costs are increasing 
significantly.” The findings of Gale et al. suggest that claims payments have increased nationally each year by an 
average of $4.7 million. Using medical malpractice claims data from the Controlled Risk Insurance Company/Risk 
Management Foundation for the period 2004 to 2008, the researchers found that “communication failures account 
for 4% of cases by volume and 7% of the total cost.” To ward against increased liability risk stemming from 
communication failures in test result notification, the researchers recommend the use of semi-automated critical test 
result management systems.  
 
 In 2011, Ryan K. Orosco, MD, made a presentation18 to the American College of Surgeons 97th Annual 
Clinical Congress in San Francisco, CA.  In it, Dr. Orosco indicated that, although surgical malpractice payments 
over time have decreased in number, such payments have increased in amount. Using data from the National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), Dr. Orosco and his colleagues examined 58,518 claims from 1990 to 2006 and 
performed multivariate regression analysis upon selected predictors of payments in excess of $1 million (using 2006 
dollars.) Dr. Orosco noted that, with regard to surgical medical malpractice, the 4 states with the highest payment 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1741891.  See also Lowes, R. (2013). Primary care malpractice cases ‘more difficult 
to defend’. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/811898_print.   
15Wallace, E., Lowry, J., Smith, S., Fahey, T. (2013). The epidemiology of malpractice claims in primary care: a systematic review. BMJ Open 
2013.  Retrieved from  http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/7/e002929.full . See also Brown, T. (2013). Missed diagnoses trigger primary care 
malpractice claims. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/808132_print.  
16  Lowes, R. (2012). Malpractice suits continue to put ob/gyns on defensive. Medscape. Sep 12, 2012.  Retrieved from 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/770777_print.  
17  Gale, B., Bissett-Siegel, D., Davidson, S., Juran, D. (2011). Failure to notify reportable test results: significance in medical malpractice. J Am 
Coll Radiol. 2011 ;8:776-779. See also Hand, L. (2011). Failure to report test results increases malpractice risk. Retrieved from 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/752967_print . 
18 Orosco, R. (presenter) (2011); Talamini, J., Chang, D., & Talamini, M. (authors) (2011); Tseng, J. & Regenbogen, S. (session moderator and 
co-moderator) (2011); American College of Surgeons (ACS) 97th Annual Clinical Congress: session SF14. October 25, 2011. Retrieved from   
http://web2.facs.org/cc_program_planner/Detail_Session_2011.cfm?CCYEAR=2011&SESSION=SF14&GROUP=SF1 . See also Helwick. C. 
(2011). Surgical malpractice claims drop, but pay-outs increase. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/753494_print . 
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amounts (IL, CT, DE, & WI) are all states without “caps” on damage awards, while the 4 states with the lowest 
payment amounts (MI, KS, SC, TX) are all states with such “caps.”   
 
 In a study19 published in the New England Journal of Medicine, Jena et al. analyzed malpractice insurance 
data from 1991 through 2005 for 40,916 physicians with 233,738 physician-years of coverage. The researchers 
estimated the cumulative risk of physicians in various high- and low-risk specialties being sued. Among their 
findings:  
 
 Each year during the study period, 7.4% of all physicians had a malpractice claim, with 1.6%  having a 
claim leading to a payment (i.e., 78% of all claims did not result in payments to  claimants). The proportion of 
physicians facing a claim each year ranged from 19.1% in  neurosurgery, 18.9% in thoracic–cardiovascular 
surgery, and 15.3% in general surgery to 5.2% in  family medicine, 3.1% in pediatrics, and 2.6% in psychiatry.  
  
The researchers estimated that “by the age of 65 years, 75% of physicians in low-risk specialties had faced a 
malpractice claim, as compared with 99% of physicians in high-risk specialties.”  
 
 In a 2011 study20  published in JAMA, Bishop et al. used data from the National Practitioner Data Bank 
from 2005 through 2009 to examine malpractice payments that result from adverse events occurring in inpatient and 
outpatient settings. The researchers performed trend analysis and a cross-sectional comparison of malpractice 
payments.  Their findings suggest that patient safety initiatives should focus on both inpatient and outpatient care. In 
addition, such initiatives should focus upon taking steps to reduce the incidence of diagnostic error.  
 
 In a study21  of 2,416 physicians that appeared in the Archives of Internal Medicine, researchers from the 
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine asked physicians to assess the following statements:  
 
1)   "Doctors order more tests and procedures than patients need to protect themselves  
 against malpractice suits," and 
2)   "Unnecessary use of diagnostic tests will not decrease without protections for physicians   
 against unwarranted malpractice suits." 
 
 Approximately 91% of the physicians surveyed indicated they practiced defensive medicine to protect 
themselves against malpractice suits. This study found “no statistically significant differences between sex, 
geographic location, specialty category, or type of practice. The largest difference was that 92.6% of male 
physicians said they practice defensive medicine vs 86.5% of female physicians.” The findings of this study suggest 
that, among physicians, the fear of lawsuits due to malpractice is widespread.  
 
 In a national survey,22  Lucas et al measured cardiologists’ self-reported propensity to recommend high-
tech and/or invasive tests and treatments.  The researchers found substantial variation in physician responses for 
some of the survey items.  Among their findings: 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Jena,A., Seabury,S., Lakdawalla,D., and Chandra, A. (2011) N Engl J Med 2011; 365:629-636; DOI: 10.1056/NEJMsa1012370. Retrieved 
from http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1012370 .  See also O’Riordan M. (2011). See also Cardiologists face above-average risk of 
malpractice suits. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/748223_print . 
20  Bishop,T., Ryan, A., Casalino, L. (2011). Paid malpractice claims for adverse events in inpatient and outpatient settings. JAMA. 
2011;305(23):2427-2431. doi:10.1001/jama.2011.813.  See also Lowes, R. (2011). Physician offices nearly as malpractice-prone as hospitals . 
Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/744599_print . 
21 Bishop,T., Federman,A., Keyhani, S., (2010).  Physicians’ views on defensive medicine: a national survey. Arch Intern Med. 2010:170:1081-
1084. See also Crane, M. (2010). New study finds 91% of physicians practice defensive medicine. Retrieved from 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/724254_print . 
22  Lucas, F., Sirovich, B., Gallagher, P., Siewars, A., Wennberg, D. (2010).  Variation in cardiologists’ propensity to test and treat: is it 
associated with regional variation in utilization? Circ Cardiovasc Qual Outcomes 2010; DOI: 10.1161/CIRCOUTCOMES.108.840009. See also 
Stiles,S. (2010). Regional variation in cardiac cath rates linked to malpractice concern. Retrieved from 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/720314_print .  
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Variability in cardiologists' propensity to test and treat partly underlies regional variation in utilization of 
general health and cardiology services. The factor most closely associated with this propensity was fear of 
malpractice suits. This factor may be an appropriate target of intervention. 
 
Recent Developments 
 
 The findings of a recent study and a survey provide good news about future trends in medical liability 
insurance claims and premiums.  A 2014 study23 in JAMA of paid malpractice claims against physicians found that, 
since 2002, such claims have decreased dramatically. Paid claims “decreased from 18.6 to 9.9 per 1,000 physicians 
per year between 2002 and 2013.” The estimated average decrease in paid claims per MD per year was 6.3%. The 
researchers used data from the National Practitioner Data Bank and the AMA’s Physician Masterfile to track claims 
from 1994-2013. The study also noted that communication and alternative dispute resolution techniques used in a 
handful of communities showed promise in reducing paid claims.  
 
 In its annual survey of medical malpractice insurance, the Medical Liability Monitor found that premiums 
have decreased for the seventh straight year for three so-called “bellwether” specialties – obgyns, internists and 
general surgeons. One reason for the decline in premiums is the continued decline in malpractice claims per 
physician. Another is the increased employment of physicians by hospitals that self-insure. This survey also found 
that the cost of coverage varies widely by state. For example, quotes for standard coverage for general surgeons 
ranged from $10,868 for a practice in Wisconsin to $190,829 for one in Miami-Dade County Florida. Although 
premiums for these three specialties have fallen on average by 13% since 2008, it should be noted that premium 
increases of 20%, 20%, and 9% occurred in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively24. A general decline in malpractice 
insurance premiums is expected to continue into 2015.25  
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  
 
The primary goals of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (often referred to as Obamacare) 
include reforming the market for private insurance, expanding Medicare coverage to the working poor, providing 
affordable insurance coverage, and improving the process by which medical decisions are made. With regard to the 
first goal, insurance companies “must offer comparable policies at the same rates to all with relatively little variation 
allowed, not exclude preexisting conditions or cancel policies, and limit their rate increases”26 . With regard to the 
second goal, the issue of expanding Medicaid to the working poor has resulted in litigation. In its landmark decision 
that upheld the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the Supreme Court also held that 
the decision to expand Medicaid to the working poor must be made on a state-by-state basis.27  As of early 
September, 2014, 27 states and the District of Columbia have opted to expand such Medicaid coverage28 . A third 
goal of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is to help workers obtain affordable health insurance 
coverage. This law provides subsidies to many of the workers who otherwise would be ineligible for expanded 
Medicare coverage. A fourth goal focuses on improving the process by which medical decisions are made. This 
includes a focus on data-driven comparative effectiveness research, alternative delivery methods, and treatment 
alternatives.  
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is as ambitious as it is controversial.  The October 1, 2013, 
debut of the health insurance exchange website known as www.healthcare.gov resulted in numerous user complaints 
that it “froze” repeatedly and made the process of signing up for health insurance both cumbersome and time-
consuming. Insurers and businesses alike have complained that the law is difficult to understand and administer. The 
implementation of several key provisions of this law has been delayed by executive order.  
                                                
23   Mello, M., Studdert, D.,Kachalia, A. (2014). JAMA. 2014;312(20):2146-2155. doi:10.1001/jama.2014.10705.   
See also Frellick, M. (2014). Steep drop in paid liability claims in past decade. Journal of American Medical Association. Retrieved from 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/834206_print . 
24 Medical Liability Monitor. (10/10/14).  http://medicalliabilitymonitor.com/news/2014/10/medical-liability-monitor-publishes-2014-annual-
survey-of-medical-malpractice-rates/.  Accessed (4/22/15).  See also Lowes, R. (2014). Medical malpractice insurance premiums nudge down 
again. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/833151_print . 
25 Page, L. (2014). 12 changes that will affect doctors’ income in 2015. Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/835123_print . 
26  Silvers, J. (2013). The affordable care act: objectives and likely results in an imperfect world, Ann Fam Med., 11(5) 402-405. 
27 United States Supreme Court (2012).  National federation of independent business  v. sebelius, 132 S.Ct 2566.  
28  See: http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap . 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a legal challenge to the way in which health insurance 
subsidies are administered. Most states have decided not to set up state health exchanges. In those states, residents 
rely on the federal health exchange marketplace to obtain coverage. Residents currently receive subsidies regardless 
of whether their state has set up its own state health exchange. However, the language of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act states that such subsidies relate to an “exchange established by the state”. If this legal challenge 
prevails, residents in states that rely upon the federal marketplace will not be eligible to receive subsidies. 
Accordingly, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is sometimes referred to as a “work in process”. 
Although it is anticipated that this new law will result in more reliance on hospital-based providers, at this time, the 
effect it may have upon medical malpractice insurance premiums is unclear. 
 
Data and Estimation 
 
The issue of tort reform can be politically contentious. In many states, tort reform has been extended to 
include injuries arising from medical malpractice.  For purposes of our analysis, we define “medical tort reform” as 
changes to state law involving medical malpractice that either: 1) restrict the ability of a party to file a personal 
injury lawsuit; or 2) place “caps” on personal injury damage awards.   
 
Existing research in this area has set forth several competing hypotheses involving medical malpractice 
insurance premiums that are “directional” in nature. Hypothesis #1 is that if medical malpractice awards increase, 
then medical malpractice insurance premiums will increase. Hypothesis #2 is that if insurers’ investment returns 
decrease, then medical malpractice insurance premiums will increase. Hypothesis #3 is that if, for a given year, there 
is an increase in the total number of states that have, or have enacted, medical tort reform legislation,29 then medical 
malpractice insurance premiums will decrease. 
 
In this article, we estimate real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) direct premiums per doctor (RDPPD) as a function 
of: 1) real  (i.e., inflation-adjusted)  direct losses per doctor (RDLPD); 2) several measures of the overall 
performance of investments; and 3) a dummy variable measuring existing statutory malpractice award limits within 
states each year.  For purposes of our analysis, we use both a standard ordinary least squares (OLS), first-difference 
estimation, and distributed lag regression.   
 
Because we use annual national-level data from 1975 to 2008 for all variables, we estimate parsimoniously 
to conserve degrees of freedom in our models.  With regard to the independent variables, we could not find adequate 
data involving yearly total medical malpractice awards in the United States. While some awards are made available 
to the public, many are not. For example, many malpractice awards are structured as legal settlements subject to 
nondisclosure provisions.  Accordingly, we use real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) direct losses paid per doctor as a 
“proxy” for yearly total medical malpractice awards. We use annual insurance industry data involving direct losses 
paid per doctor contained in a recent consumer health publication (Hunter, Cassell-Stiga, & Doroshow, 2009).  We 
obtain the monthly closing index value of the S&P 500, Treasury bills, and Treasury bonds, calculate the continuous 
rate of return for each, and use each separately as a proxy for insurers’ investment returns during that period30.  For 
the independent variable measuring the presence of tort reform, we use original constructed data compiled by 
examining the laws of each state during the period 1975-2010.  For a given year, if a state has a medical tort reform 
law on its books, a value of “1” is assigned. If not, the state is assigned a value of “0”.   For a state to receive a “1,” 
there must be a law in effect that places a strict limit on non-economic damages (also referred to as “pain and 
suffering” awards).  Each year, the sum of the values for all 50 states is computed as an indicator of the number of 
states with damage caps. The resulting number is used to track the prevalence of tort reform in the United States 
during the period 1975-2010. 
 
During the period, the annual rate of return averaged 1) for Treasury bills, about 5.5%; 2) for the S&P 500, 
about 8.5%; and 3) for the entire stock market, more than 13% (see Table 1). During the period, on average, less 
                                                
29 For purposes of our analysis, we will assume that an increase in medical malpractice tort reform will result in a decrease in medical malpractice 
awards.   
30 Because we use rates of return, no inflation adjustment is required. 
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than one additional state adopted medical malpractice non-economic damage caps per year. In addition, direct 
premiums (RDPPD) averaged more than twice the direct losses paid (RDLPD).  
 
Since we are estimating with time series data, it is important to test for a unit root process in our data series.  
The validity of the OLS estimation process depends on the data being stationary.  If the process is non-stationary, 
the use of OLS can produce spurious regression, upwardly biasing the t-stats and R-square.  We perform a modified 
Dickey-Fuller t-test for a unit root in which the series has been transformed by a generalized least-squares regression 
(see Table 2).  It tests if a variable follows a unit-root process. The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit 
root --a non-stationary process-- and the alternative is that the variable is generated by a stationary process.  We test 
up to nine lagged periods, rejecting the null in only one of the nine at the 0.1 level of significance. However, several 
of the test statistics are only slightly outside the rejection region.  For this reason, we present both the OLS and the 
first-difference regression results. 
 
Let us first consider a parsimonious model that uses the rate of return on US Treasury bonds 
(TBONDS_ROR).31  The first model is estimated with all contemporaneous variables.  The results are summarized 
in Table 3.  The only variable that is a significant determinant of the direct premiums paid per doctor is the presence 
of more states with tort reform laws.  For each additional state that adopts legislation limiting non-economic 
damages, premiums are reduced by $195 per doctor per year.  Higher rates of return are associated with lower 
premiums as well, but the impact is small and statistically insignificant for the contemporaneous period data.  We 
estimate this equation with the average rate of return for Treasury bonds, Treasury bills, and the S & P 500, but, in 
the standard OLS model, none of these measures of market return resulted in a p-value less than 0.51. The variable 
known as direct losses per doctor (RDLPD) has the expected positive impact on insurance premiums.  Each dollar 
lost per doctor is associated with $0.47 in added premium costs per doctor.  Variation in the three independent 
variables explains only about 19% of the variation in the insurance premiums. 
 
The impacts of investments, insurance payouts, and state tort laws may take longer than a year to affect 
insurance rates, especially when insurance premiums are likely to be paid once a year.  To account for the potential 
for a lagged impact on premium prices, we estimate models that use lagged independent variables as determinants.  
To conserve degrees of freedom, we only estimate models with up to five periods of lags.  The model that provides 
the best overall fit based on R-squared is the one that lags direct losses two periods and state tort reform laws five 
periods.32  Treasury bonds are lagged four periods (see Tables 4 & 5). Treasury bills are lagged one period (see 
Table 5)33.    The impacts of the lagged right-hand side variables are both larger and more significant than those 
from the contemporaneous period.   
 
Table 4 indicates that, when using Treasury bonds as a proxy for investment rate of return, one additional 
state adopting tort reform legislation results in an average $350 decrease in malpractice premiums per doctor.  This 
impact is significant at all typical confidence levels.  The variable known as direct losses per doctor lagged two 
periods (L2_RDLPD) also has a significant impact upon yearly insurance premiums.  This result suggests that if 
average losses increase by one dollar, premiums increase by more than what is required to offset the loss, or $1.33.  
Curiously, the rate of return on Treasury bonds four periods prior results in higher, rather than lower, malpractice 
insurance premiums, suggesting that as returns on Treasury bonds increase, premiums rise as well; however, this 
result is not significant at the 10% level. 
 
Treasury bonds represent longer-term financial instruments, whereas Treasury bills are primarily short-term 
instruments.  If, in the regression, we substitute the rate of return on Treasury bills for that on Treasury bonds, we 
find that a higher rate of return on Treasury bills results in significantly lower insurance premiums in the current 
year.34  A one percentage point increase in the Treasury bills’ rate of return reduces average malpractice insurance 
premiums by $642 per doctor per year, as compared with $549 for an additional state with tort reform legislation. 
                                                
31 Though not presented in our results in Table 3, we also estimate the impact of the rate of return from the S&P 500; however, the impact was not 
significantly correlated in the contemporaneous period. 
32 The optimal lag length for rate of returns on investment varies with the investment used in the regression. 
33 Regressions using the S&P 500 index are not presented since its inclusion produced no statistically significant impact on insurance premiums 
regardless of the lag period. 
34 In our model, we used contemporaneous rate of return on Treasury bills in Table 5, as opposed to the rate of return on Treasury bonds lagged 
four periods in Table 4. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – Fourth Quarter 2015 Volume 13, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 184 The Clute Institute 
To account for potential non-stationary data, we estimate the first-difference model with and without a 
constant term and with and without lags.  All but the differenced model with lagged Treasury bonds provide similar 
results to the regression without the constant term.  These results tell a compelling story.  Contemporaneously, tort 
reform and medical malpractice insurance premiums may be endogenous.  Although we use state tort reform laws to 
explain insurance premiums, it is just as plausible that current period higher premiums may lead to a higher 
likelihood that a given state will adopt malpractice reform laws. 
 
The positive impact of the first difference in tort reform in the equations without lags indicates that higher 
premiums are associated with malpractice reform laws; however, the lagged values of tort reform legislation cannot 
be endogenous.  It would be incorrect to suggest that current malpractice premiums have an effect on tort reform 
legislation five periods earlier.  Therefore, let us focus on the third equations in both Table 6 and 7.  These equations 
display a better overall fit than the fourth equations in both tables and the change in the Treasury bills’ rates of 
return have a higher p-value in both models.  The third equations in both Table 6 and 7 indicate that an increase in 
losses per doctor is associated with significantly higher premiums.  The presence of tort reform is associated with a 
substantial reduction in insurance premiums, which is also significant to at least the 2% level.  Furthermore, an 
increase in the rate of return on Treasury bills is associated with a substantial reduction in insurance premiums, but 
the impact falls just shy of the 1% level of significance. Table 5 performs OLS regression (with lags) using the rate 
of return on Treasury Bills. As the rate of return on Treasury Bills increases, premiums tend to decrease and such 
impact is statistically significant. Estimates of the impact of rates of return on medical malpractice insurance 
premiums are significant in one of three of our specifications. These results suggest that direct losses, tort reform, 
and, to a lesser extent, investments each play a role in the determination of malpractice insurance premiums.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We find that changes in the number of states with tort reform legislation appear to be the primary reason for 
changes in medical malpractice insurance premiums.  Interestingly, however, malpractice reform laws do not 
produce their desired impacts immediately.  Our estimates suggest that a legislative change in a given state may take 
up to five years to have its maximum impact upon medical malpractice insurance premiums. 
 
We also find that direct losses are associated with higher insurance premiums. As is the case with tort 
reform legislation, the impact of higher or lower payouts takes time to appear in the form of premium changes.  
Higher average losses translate almost dollar-for-dollar into higher average premiums, and, in at least one of our 
models, the impact of a dollar lost per doctor two periods’ prior results in more than a dollar increase in average 
premiums per doctor.  This is consistent with the findings of Helland and Showalter (2009) in which an additional 
$1 of expected losses can increase premiums by up to $1.05 without controlling for the impact of investment rates of 
return. 
 
We find that market rates of return are also associated with insurance premiums. However, the size and 
direction of the impacts depend upon the type of financial instruments measured, and the lag length of the returns.  
In some specifications, the magnitude of the impact of a one-percentage point change in the investment rate of return 
is comparable to the impact of the presence of tort reform in one additional state.  Among measures of investment 
returns, the average rate of return for Treasury bills, a relatively short-term investment instrument, has the strongest 
correlation across all model specifications.  Furthermore, the rates of return for investment instruments held by 
health insurers are likely to be exogenous in the equation (i.e., rates of return on Treasury securities are not likely to 
be determined by changes in malpractice premiums).  Unfortunately, we do not have access to the actual investment 
portfolios of health insurance providers.  Nevertheless, our results highlight that rates of return on short-term 
investments influence malpractice premiums independent of the existence of medical malpractice tort reform. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a one percentage point increase in the rate of return of Treasury bills reduces real 
malpractice insurance premiums by $642 per doctor, as compared with $549 for an additional state enacting tort 
reform legislation.  Taken together, the combined effect is $1,191 per doctor/per year/per medical malpractice 
insurance policy.  This represents 11.9% of the average annual cost of a medical malpractice insurance policy.35 
                                                
35 Our calculation of the percentage of the average annual cost of a medical malpractice insurance policy per doctor is inflation adjusted and uses 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
RDPPD 15819.14 3675.213 10970.23 22881.47 
RDLPD 7084.916 1807.136 3231.54 9425.2 
STATE_TORT 16.52941 8.951842 2 29 
NEWSTATETORT 0.852941 2.002004 0 11 
S&P_ROR 8.508857 17.14148 -37.28 34.52 
STOCKROR 13.1342 17.0702 -36.58 37.2 
TBILLSROR 5.4797 3.1919 0.13 14.3 
TBONDSROR 8.3236 10.1672 -11.12 32.81 
 
Table 2. Modified Dickey-Fuller T-test Results 
Lags Test Statistic 1% 5% 10% 
9 -2.775 -3.77 -2.811 -2.388 
8 -2.278 -3.77 -2.788 -2.406 
7 -1.398 -3.77 -2.814 -2.46 
6 -1.707 -3.77 -2.879 -2.542 
5 -1.722 -3.77 -2.971 -2.643 
4 -2.346 -3.77 -3.08 -2.754 
3 -2.792 -3.77 -3.195 -2.866 
2 -2.666 -3.77 -3.305 -2.97 
1 -2.931 -3.77 -3.4 -3.058 
 
Table 3. OLS Regression Results 
Variable Coef. t-stat p-val 
RDLPD 0.470642 1.26 0.217 
STATES_TORT -195.247 -2.63 0.013 
TBONDS_ROR -13.0057 -0.21 0.837 
CONSTANT 15827.63 6.45 0 
R-Sq 0.1894   
 
Table 4. OLS Regression Results with Lags 
(Using Treasury Bonds) 
Variable Coef. t-stat p-val 
L2_RDLPD 1.336408 5.00 0.000 
L5_STATES_TORT -349.713 -7.60 0.000 
L4_TBONDS_ROR 56.41591 1.58 0.126 
CONSTANT 9701.303 4.98 0.000 
R-Sq 0.7681    
Table 5. OLS Regression Results with Lags 
(Using Treasury Bills) 
Variable Coef. t-stat p-val 
L2_RDLPD 0.902262 2.88 0.008 
L5_STATES_TORT -549.608 -6.82 0.00 
TBILLS_ROR -642.051 -2.67 0.013 
CONSTANT 20035.42 4.67 0.00 
R-Sq 0.8016   
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Table 6. Differenced Regression Results with and without Lags 
Dep. Variable = D_RDPPD Coef. t-stat p-val 
D_RDLPD 0.861 1.830 0.077 
D_STATES_TORT 378.376 2.850 0.008 
D_TBILLS_ROR -249.017 -1.580 0.125 
CONSTANT -546.053 -1.930 0.063 
R-Sq 0.332   
D_RDLPD 0.931 1.920 0.065 
D_STATES_TORT 412.061 3.020 0.005 
D_TBONDS_ROR 12.493 0.700 0.491 
CONSTANT -549.148 -1.880 0.071 
R-Sq 0.286   
D_L2_RDLPD 0.881 1.950 0.063 
D_L5_STATES_TORT -335.787 -2.600 0.016 
D_TBILLS_ROR -264.971 -1.590 0.125 
CONSTANT -10.495 -0.040 0.971 
R-Sq 0.369   D_L2_RDLPD 2.561 2.080 0.048 
D_L5_STATES_TORT 157.787 0.440 0.664 
D_L4_TBONDS_ROR 51.741 1.080 0.289 
CONSTANT 15020.000 19.920 0.000 
R-Sq 0.163    
Table 7. Differenced Regression Results with and without Lags 
(no constant term) 
Dep. Variable = D_RDPPD Coef. t-stat p-val 
D_RDLPD 0.762 1.560 0.129 
D_STATES_TORT 280.139 2.190 0.037 
D_TBILLS_ROR -242.647 -1.470 0.151 
R-Sq 0.253 
  D_RDLPD 0.828 1.650 0.109 
D_STATES_TORT 311.764 2.390 0.023 
D_TBONDS_ROR 10.453 0.560 0.578 
R-Sq 0.208 
  D_L2_RDLPD 0.879 2.000 0.057 
D_L5_STATES_TORT -337.469 -2.850 0.009 
D_TBILLS_ROR -264.482 -1.620 0.117 
R-Sq 0.375 
  D_L2_RDLPD 6.967 1.400 0.173 
D_L5_STATES_TORT 3145.298 2.350 0.027 
D_L4_TBONDS_ROR 209.611 1.090 0.288 
R-Sq 0.208 
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
Figure 1. Direct Premiums Per Doctor (2008 Dollars)36 
 
                                                
36 Data obtained from a report by Americans for Insurance Reform entitled “ True Risk: Medical Liability, Malpractice Insurance and Health 
Care”,  (Hunter, Cassell-Stiga, & Doroshow, 2009) . 
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